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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appellant Neldon P. Johnson submits this opening brief in appeal before this
Court.
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The Appellant
Neldon P. Johnson
The Appellee
Ina Mane Johnson1

Ina Mane Johnson will be referred to throughout this brief as "Mrs, Johnson" for
purposes of consistency. It should be noted that Ina has been divorced from Neldon Johnson and
has remarried.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."2 Section 78-2a3(2)(h) of the Utah Code, provides that the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
appeals from the district court for domestic relations cases, including divorce, This is an
appeal from the final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court regarding a domestic
relations case.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the lack of essential contract terms regarding the trust deed and trust deed note
and the number of parcels to be transferred make the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce
ambiguous and/or unenforceable?
Standard of Review; Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah 1999),
2. Did the modifications of the trust deed and trust deed note by the Court, without
the consent of Mr. Johnson, make the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous
and/or unenforceable?

2

Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5.
1

Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah 1999).
3. Was the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or unenforceable
because the parties failed to have a meeting of the minds on the integral features of how
many parcels were going to be deeded to Mrs. Johnson and the terms and conditions of the
trust deed and trust deed note?
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah 1999).
4. Was the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce ambiguous and/or unenforceable
because it lacked sufficient defmiteness to be enforced?
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah 1999).

2

5. Is the use of contempt proceedings barred by the one-action rule in Utah Code
Ann. § 78-37-1 where the parties agreed in the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce that
a trust deed and trust deed note would secure the property settlement?
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas, Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah 1999). Legal determinations concerning the proper interpretation of a statute are
reviewed for correctness, and therefore the Court of Appeals should apply a de novo standard
here. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997).
6. Does the use of contempt proceedings violate article I, section 16 of the Utah
Constitution where the contempt proceedings are used to enforce a property settlement
secured by a trust deed and trust deed note, where the property settlement does not involve
either alimony payments or child support payments?
Standard of Review: A matter "of statutory interpretation [is] a question of law that
we review on appeal for correctness." State v. Schofield, 63 P.3d 667 (Utah 2002).
7. Is the use of contempt proceedings prior to July 1, 2006 appropriate when the
parties agreed in the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce that a balloon payment on July
1, 2006 would be used to pay for any outstanding payments under the Amended Decree of
Divorce?

3

Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah 1999).
8. Was it erroneous for Judge Howard to hold that the issues in Mr. Johnson's Motion
to Set Aside Decree of Divorce dated January 13, 2006 were res judicata.
Standard of Review:

The determination of whether res judicata bars an action

presents a question of law. "When reviewing questions of law, we accord no particular
deference to the conclusions of law made by the court but review them for correctness." State
v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 535 (Utah 1993).
9. Was it erroneous for Judge Howard to award a judgment to Mrs. Johnson in the
amount of $223,982.97 for monthly payments under the stipulated Amended Decree of
Divorce when two parcels of property had been inadvertently deeded to Mrs. Johnson, where
the value of the property far exceeded the amount owing and where the monthly payments
had been secured by a trust deed and trust deed note and the parties had stipulated to a
balloon payment in July 2006 for any past due payments.
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.
Therefore the appellate court gives the trial court's conclusions regarding the contract no
deference and reviews them for correctness." Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const., 983 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah 1999).
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10. Was it eiToneous for Judge Howard to award attorney's fees incurred by Mrs.
Johnson prior to the filing of the order to show cause?
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question
of law [that] we review for correctness.'" A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heatuig v. Guy, 47
P.3d 92 (Utah App. 2002)(citation omitted), affd, 94 P.3d 270 (2004).
11. Was it erroneous for Judge Howard to award attorney's fees to Mrs. Johnson for
any fees other than those incurred for preparation and attendance of the January 23, 2006
hearing.
Standard of Review; Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question
of law [that] we review for correctness.'11 A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 47
P.3d 92 (Utah App. 2002)(citation omitted), affd, 94 P.3d 270 (2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
This matter is a divorce case. The parties reached a stipulated settlement that was
entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court as an Amended Decree of Divorce.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
The district court entered a Decree of Divorce on June 6, 2001. (R. 309-310). The
decree was based upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the district court
on the same date. (R. 307-308), Thereafter, the parties reached a stipulated settlement
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agreement that was read into the record and accepted by the district court and memorialized
in the Amended Decree of Divorce (Appendix 1., R. 320 - 326) and the Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Appendix 2., R. 311-318). Pursuant to the Amended
Decree of Divorce, Mr. Johnson's counsel prepared a trust deed, trust deed note and quitclaim deed. Mr. Johnson signed the trust deed note, the trust deed and the quit claim deed
on August 28, 2002. (R. 834-838). The trust deed was recorded on September 4, 2002 as
entry 102294:2002 with the Utah County Recorder. (R. 833-834). The quit-claim deed was
recorded on September 4, 2002 as Entry No. 102293:2002 with the Utah County Recorder.
R. 828-831). Mr. Johnson's counsel filed a Notice of Execution and Recordation of Deeds
and Execution of Note with the district court on September 24, 2002. (R. 840). The notice
contained a copy of the executed and recorded trust deed, trust deed note and quit-claim
deed. (R. 828-840). Mrs. Johnson subsequently requested an order to show cause hearing
alleging that Mr. Johnson was in contempt of court for not making the monthly payments
under the decree of divorce. (R. 1824). The matter was presented to Commissioner Patton
wherein Commissioner Patton denied Mrs. Johnson's Order to Show Cause, but unilaterally,
without any objection from Mrs. Johnson or her counsel, found the trust deed recorded by
Mr. Johnson was "contemptuous" and Commissioner Patton was "offended by the trust
deed." See March 7, 2003 Hearing, pg. 46 lines 1-4 and pg. 47 lines 5-8 (R. 1824). The
Commissioner ordered Mrs. Johnson's counsel to prepare a new trust deed with an
acceleration clause that if Mr. Johnson was not current by December 1, 2003 on his
obligations under the trust deed note then the entire outstanding balance becomes due and
6

payable on the entire outstanding balance. Id. at pg. 49, lines 8-15 (R. 1824). Mr. Johnson's
counsel filed an objection to the trust deed and trust deed note prepared by Mrs. Johnson's
counsel that was heard before Judge Claudia Laycock on July 28, 2003. (R. 1 823)
At the July 28, 2003 hearing, Judge Laycock granted Mr, Johnson's objection in part,
denied it in part, and ordered Mrs. Johnson's counsel to amend the trust deed note. See July
28,2003 Hearing, pg. 70 lines 11-17 (R. 1823). Judge Laycock also reviewed Mr. Johnson's
Motion to Set Aside the Amended Decree of Divorce. Id. at pg. 70. Judge Laycock found
the decree unambiguous. Id. at pg. 74 lines 6-12. The Order Denying the Motion to Set
Aside the Divorce Decree was never signed by Judge Laycock, but was eventually signed by
Judge Howard on February 7, 2006. R. 1704-1707.

In addition, Judge Howard signed

several other unsigned orders from matters that had been before Judge Laycock, including
the Order Denying Objection to Prior Order of Attorney's Fees (R. 1715-1717), Order on
Objection to Order on Order to Show Cause (R. 1712-1714), Order Regarding Objection
Regarding Community Service (R. 1708-1711), and the Order on Objections to Trust Deed
and Trust Deed Note R. (1699-1703). As the record reflects, none of the orders signed by
Judge Howard were sent to Mr. Johnson's counsel, but the orders were signed with the
originate certificate of mailing dated July 30, 2003. On February 23, 2006, the district court
entered a subsequent ruling and order entitled "Ruling and Order: Re Respondent's Objection
to Newly Prepared Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed." (R. 1731-1735). A copy of the order
was sent to Mr. Johnson's counsel by the district court. (R. 1731). On the same date, the
district court entered a ruling entitled "Ruling Re: Order to Show Cause." (R. 1737-1741).
7

Finally, the district court entered an order entitled "Order, In Re: January 23, 2006 Hearing"
that was signed by the district court on February 27, 2006. (R. 1758-1761).
Facts established in the Record below:
1.

The parties in the present action were married on May 3, 1964. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact ^| 2. (R. 307-308)

2.

The parties were divorced on June 6, 2001 in a bifurcated proceeding. Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of Law ]ffl 1-2. (R. 307)

3.

An Amended Decree of Divorce was negotiated between the parties and entered on
June 27, 2001. (R. 311-326)

4.

Both parties were represented by counsel during the negotiated settlement and
corresponding Amended Decree of Divorce. Amended Decree of Divorce, pg. 1. (R.
326).

5.

The Amended Decree of Divorce does not award any alimony to Mrs. Johnson. See
Amended Decree ^ 11. (R. 320).

6.

The Amended Decree awards Mrs. Johnson the real property at 5629 West 6400
South in American Fork. Amended Decree^ 3(A). (R. 325). This property has been
deeded to Mrs. Johnson. (R. 828-831)
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The Amended Decree awards Mrs. Johnson the real property at 512 South 860 East,
American Fork, Utah. Amended Decree ^| 3(B). (R. 326). This property has been
deeded to Mrs. Johnson. (R. 828-831)
In addition to the property described in the Amended Decree and set forth in
paragraph 6 and 7 above, Mrs, Johnson was inadvertently deeded two additional
parcels that were not contemplated under the Amended Decree of Divorce. (R. 828831).
The Decree of Divorce awards Mrs. Johnson the sum of $2,800,000, the real property
and funds in the Smith Barney account. Amended Decree % 5. (R. 322-323).
Payment of the $2,800,000 is to be paid in a monthly payment of $8,3333.33,
commencing July 1, 2001. Amended Decree ^f 5. (R. 322).
Any amounts still due and owing on July 1, 2006, shall be paid in full with one
balloon payment due no later than July 1, 2006. Amended Decree ^1 5(b). (R, 322)
The following sentence was crossed-out, deleted and initialed by the parties, "In the
event payment is not timely made, the entire balance shall become immediately due
and payable." Amended Decree ^ 5(d). (R. 322)
In the Amended Decree, the parties specifically negotiated that Mrs. Johnson receive
a secured interest in the "U-Check" real and personal property, to include all
inventory, and that Mrs. Johnson shall be a lien holder in the second position behind
the existing loan at Zion's bank in the approximate balance of $600,000. Amended
9

Decree ^ 5(e). (R. 322). The parties inserted the phrase, "Security to be a trust deed
and trust deed note." Amended Decree Tj 5(e). (R. 322).
13.

Mr. Johnson signed the trust deed note, the trust deed and the quit claim deed on
August 28, 2002. (R. 834-838). Mr. Johnson's counsel filed a Notice of Execution
and Recordation of Deeds and Execution of Note with the district court on September
24, 2002. (R. 840). The notice contained a copy of the executed Trust Deed, Trust
Deed Note and Quit-Claim Deed. (R. 828-840).

14.

Mr. Johnson recorded the trust feed on September 4, 2002 as entry 102294:2002 with
the Utah County Recorder. (R. 833-834)

15.

Mr. Johnson sent a copy of the Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed to the Court and
to counsel for Mrs. Johnson on September 24, 2002. (R. 839-840)

16.

Mrs. Johnson requested an order to show cause hearing alleging that Mr. Johnson was
in contempt of court for not making the monthly payment under the decree of divorce.
(R. 1824)

17.

During the oral argument, Commissioner Patton asked Mr. Johnson's counsel for a
copy of the trust deed and trust deed note that had been signed and recorded by Mr.
Johnson. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824, pg. 42 lines 20-22).

18.

Commissioner Patton, sua sponte, took a ten minute recess so that he could review the
documents in chambers. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824, pg. 42 lines 5-6).
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19.

When Commissioner Patton returned to the hearing, he asked Mr. Johnson's counsel
why Mrs. Johnson had not signed either the trust deed or the trust deed note. March
7, 2003 (Hearing R. 1824 pg. 43 lines 6-7).

20.

At the time of the March 7, 2003 hearing, Mrs. Johnson and her counsel had been in
possession of the trust deed and trust deed note for seven months. They had been
delivered to Mrs, Johnson's counsel on September 24, 2002. (R. 839-840), During
this seven month period, neither Mrs. Johnson nor her counsel had ever objected to
the form of the trust deed or the trust deed note.

21.

Commissioner Patton, sua sponte and without any pending objection before the Court
or prompting by either party or their counsel, announced that the Court was
"offended" by the trust deed note and Commissioner Patton announced that the trust
deed note was "contemptuous." March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824 pgs. 45-49).

22.

Specifically, Commissioner Patton found that the following non-recourse language
contained in the note was offensive, "[i]f maker fails to pay any payment provided by
this note when due, the exclusive remedy of the holder of the Trust Deed and this note
shall be the foreclosure of the Trust Deed and the holder shall not be entitled to
recover from maker any deficiency under this note." March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824
pgs. 46-47).

23.

Commissioner Patton argued that under the case of Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333
(Utah App. 1987), Mrs. Johnson was not bound by the Promissory Note because she
had not signed the same. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824 pg. 47 lines 8-17).

24.

Commissioner Patton then instructed Mrs. Johnson to draft a new trust deed note,
changing the terms and conditions of the stipulated settlement, and ordered Mr.
Johnson to sign the note. March 7, 2003 Hearing (R. 1824 pg. 48 lines 5-12).

26.

At the July 28, 2003 Hearing, Judge Laycock attempted to draft a trust deed from the
bench by ordering Mrs. Johnson's counsel to amend the trust deed prepared by her.
See July 28, 2003 Hearing, pg. 70 lines 11-17 (R. 1823).

27.

At the July 28,2003 hearing, Mr. Johnson, through counsel, objected to the trust deed
and trust deed note several times. See July 28, 2003 Hearing (R. 1823).

28.

The parties have been unable to agree on the terms and conditions of a trust deed
note. Judge Howard has now ordered that Mr. Johnson sign a trust deed prepared by
Mrs. Johnson's counsel. Ruling and Order dated February 23, 2006 (R. 1789-1793).
Mrs. Johnson filed an Order to Show Cause on April 29, 2005.
SUMMARY OF ARC UMENTS
1.

This case involves a stipulated divorce decree that lacks the essential terms to

be properly enforced by the Court. Several motions and hearings have been held to try and
decipher, modify, clarify, interpret, create, reconstruct and enforce a divorce decree that lacks
essential terms and is ambiguous. The district court's ruling that the stipulated decree of
12

divorce was not ambiguous should be reversed because the stipulated decree is subject to
se\ cral interpretations with respect to the number of parcels deeded to Mrs. Jolinson and the
terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note. In addition, the parties never had
a meeting of the minds on the essential terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed
note. Mr. Johnson understood that the trust deed would be a non-recourse trust deed at the
time of the stipulated settlement. Mrs. Johnson claims that the trust deed was not a nonrecourse trust deed. The stipulated settlement and the Amended Decree of Di\ orce are both
silent on the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note. Therefore, the decree
is ambiguous and the court should look to parol evidence to clarify the meaning of the decree
or find the agreement unenforceable.
2.

The stipulated settlement and subsequent decree of divorce based upon that

stipulation was the result of the negotiation between Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson. Both
parties were represented by counsel during the negotiations. The district court did not have
the authority to modify the terms of the stipulation or supply missing terms, unless such terms
or conditions were statutorily mandated (such as child support). The district court's
unilateral modification of the stipulation, by drafting language to insert into the trust deed
and trust deed note, materially changed the stipulation between the parties and created a new
agreement without the consent of Mr. Johnson. The modification of a stipulated settlement
must be consented to by the parties making the stipulation. Otherwise, there is no meeting
of the minds or mutual consent and the agreement is void.
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3. Where the parties have voluntarily agreed to secure payment in a property
settlement agreement with a trust deed, the plain language of the agreement requires the use
of the trust deed to collect and overdue payment under the stipulated property settlement.
The application of the one-action rule at Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-1 also serves to place
the personal assets of Mr. Johnson beyond the reach of Mrs. Johnson until the value of the
pledged property is exhausted.
4. A contempt proceeding violates Article I, Section 16 of the Utah Constitutionprohibiting imprisonment for debt- and therefore the trial court has no power to order
payments on the property settlement or to use the contempt sanction to enforce the stipulated
divorce decree.
5. Res Judicata does not apply to Mr. Johnson's Motion to Set Aside the Divorce
Decree because the prior proceeding did not meet the four elements required to be present
for res judicata. Neither the district court or Mrs. Johnson provided any analysis on the four
elements required for issue preclusion.
6. The award of attorney's fees was erroneous because the Court awarded attorney's
fees incurred for motions not before the Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce is Not Enforceable

The alleged divorce decree lacks the integral features that are essential to the
formation of an enforceable agreement. For the reasons set forth below, the district court
14

should have set aside the decree of divorce and allowed the parties to either renegotiate the
decree on mutually agreeable terms and conditions or set the case for trial. Instead, the
district court entered a ruling and order requiring Mr. Johnson to sign the newly prepared
trust deed and trust deed note that Mr. Johnson did not agree to nor was the newly prepared
trust deed or trust deed note part of the stipulation between the parties. Ruling and Order Re:
Respondent's Objections to Newly Prepared Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed (R. 18001804).
A. No Meeting of the Minds
In Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, the Utah Supreme Court noted that , r a meeting of the minds
on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract"' and,
consequently, lp[a]n agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite."1 78 P.3d 600,
602 (Utah 2003) {quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsem, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996)).
"It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is
essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are
indefinite "Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996)
(citations omitted); see also Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427,428 (Utah 1961) ("A condition
precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the
parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness
to be enforced.").
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It has become painfully apparent to everyone involved in this proceeding that there
was no meeting of the minds with respect to the security pledged in the amended decree of
divorce. In the amended decree of divorce, the parties negotiated that Mrs. Johnson receive
a secured interest in the "U-Check" real and personal property, to include all inventory, and
that Mrs. Johnson become a lien holder in the second position behind the existing loan at
Zion's bank in the approximate balance of $600,000. Amended Decree of Divorce ^ 5(e).
(R. 322). The parties both initialed a handwritten provision in the payment section of the
decree "Security to be a trust deed and trust deed note." Amended Decree ^| 5(e) (R. 322).
Mr. Johnson provided a trust deed and trust deed note that was never objected to by Mrs.
Johnson. Mr. Johnson believed at the time of the negotiated decree that the sole recourse of
Mrs. Johnson would be to exercise her security interest in the store. Mrs. Johnson now
claims that she believed that the security provided in the real and personal property of the LiCheck store was not provided as her only recourse, as has been evidenced in her several
motions for contempt and attempts to receive payment by attacking the personal assets of Mr.
Johnson. Therefore, there was no meeting of the minds on this essential and critical point
of the divorce decree and therefore the decree must be set aside.
In addition to the lack of understanding with respect to the security set forth in the
Amended Decree, there was no meeting of the minds with respect to the real property
distributed to the parties. Mrs. Johnson was inadvertently deeded two parcels of property that
were neither authorized nor contemplated by the divorce decree. July 28,2003 Hearing, pgs.
53-77 (R. 1823). Mrs. Johnson has taken the position that the real property was correctly
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deeded to her. Mr. Johnson never contemplated nor understood that the divorce decree
awarded these two parcels to Mrs. Johnson. The district court judge refused to receive and
consider evidence regarding the original written stipulation of the parties that would have
clarified the ambiguity. See July 28, 2003 Hearing, pg. 59 lines 4-7. (R. 1823). There was
no meeting of the minds with respect to this critical provision in the amended decree of
divorce and therefore it should be set aside. The extremely harsh result of attempting to
enforce this aspect of the decree gives Mrs. Johnson a huge windfall and violates the
equitable principles upon which the district court acting in domestic casses is founded. As
set forth in the Amended Decree, both provisions referencing specific acreage of land were
struck by the parties. See Amended Decree, Tflf 3(A) and 3(B). (R, 324-325). The
subsequent conveyance of the acreage struck by the parties creates a tremendous windfall to
Mrs. Johnson that the district court has refused to acknowledge or accept in the proceedings
below.
B. Utah Courts Not Authorized To Fabricate Contracts
Utah Courts are not authorized to rewrite, modify or fabricate contract terms and
conditions where the parties have failed to complete an agreement. In short, "where there
was simply some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be entered into in the future,
the court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and enforce
it." Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Utah 1961).

Commissioner Patton has

unilaterally attempted to rewrite, modify and alter the terms and conditions of the amended
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decree of divorce by imposing his own terms and conditions in the trust deed and trust deed
note. Order to Show Cause Hearing of March 7, 2003, pgs. 42- 51. (R. 1824). The district
court is not authorized to write or modify the divorce decree, when the parties had carefully
negotiated the terms and conditions. Therefore, the amended decree of divorce should be set
aside and the district court should give the parties the opportunity to negotiate the terms and
conditions of the settlement.
C. Future Negotiations Make Contract Incomplete and Unenforceable
If there is "any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations or considerations
to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there is no contract
at all.n Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah 1926). The amended decree o(
divorce does not set forth the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note.
Because the terms and conditions of this critical part of the decree are left for future
negotiations, there is not a completed contract and the matter must be set aside. "It is
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential
to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite."
Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citing Pingree v. Cont'l
Group of Utah, Inc.,55S P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976)); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427,
428 (1961)) (additional citations omitted); see also Candland v. Oldroyd,248?. 1101, 1102
(1926) ("So long as there is any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations or
considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract. In fact, there

18

is no contract at all"). The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the
parties' intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually existed, there can
be no contract to enforce.
D, Lack of Essential Terms Make Contract Invalid
"A contract may be enforced even though some contract terms may be missing or left
to be agreed upon, but if the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for
deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract." Acad.
Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (111. 1991) (citations omitted).
"Whether or not the [missing term] was essential to the contract requires an examination of
the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into."
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978). Merely satisfying the
minimum requirements for the statute of frauds does not automatically render all contracts
sufficiently definite to be enforced by the courts. The terms and conditions of the trust deed
and trust deed note are essential terms to the decree of divorce. Because the parties failed
to negotiate the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note, the decree must
be set aside.
E. Contract Unenforceable if Lacks Sufficient Defmiteness to be Enforced
An unenforceable agreement to agree occurs when parties to a contract fail to agree
on material terms of the contract "with sufficient defmiteness to be enforced." Cottonwood
Malt Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427,
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428 (Utah 1961)). The present action provides a living example of what happens when
material terms are omitted from an agreement and then one of the parties attempts to enforce
the agreement. In this case, Petitioner has attempted to enforce the agreement via contempt
proceedings, when her exclusive remedy under Utah's one-action rule is to proceed against
the security of the trust deed and trust deed note in the U-check real and personal property.
The terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note have not been finalized,
negotiated or completed by the parties, therefore the amended decree is impossible to enforce
and should be set aside.
F. To Be Valid, Modification Requires Mutual Consent, Not Unilateral Modification
"[Pjarties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of a contract."
Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 877 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(quotations and citation omitted). "A valid modification of a contract... requiresr a meeting
of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with
sufficient definiteness.m Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah
1996) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d427,428 (1961)); see Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d
214 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999)(noting that to "alter, or supplant a contract fairly made,""[t]he same
meeting of the minds is needed that was necessary to make the contract in the first place"
(quotations, emphasis, and citation omitted)). ""[Contractual mutual assent requires assent
by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms."
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048,1050 (Utah \918);seealsoSacklerv.
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Savin, 897

P.2d 1217, 1220-22 (Utah 1995) (holding that to form an enforceable contract, there must
be a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement).
In the present action, Commissioner Patton unilaterally ordered Mrs. Johnson to draft
the terms and conditions of the trust deed and trust deed note and Judge Howard's February
23, 2006 Order now requires that Mr. Johnson sign a trust deed and trust deed note that he
did not agree to nor were the terms and conditions set forth in the Amended Decree of
Divorce. The district court's unilateral modification of the divorce decree is a contract
modification without mutual consent and therefore invalid. It is axiomatic that both parties
to the agreement must consent to and agree upon the terms and conditions of the trust deed
and trust deed note. The district court does not have the ability to force one party to agree
to a modification to a stipulated decree of divorce. Therefore, the decision of the district
court requiring Mr. Johnson to sign the newly prepared trust deed and trust deed note should
be reversed.
II.

The Use of Contempt Proceedings are Barred by the Stipulated Amended
Decree of Divorce and the Utah One-Action Rule

The trial court summarily dismissed Mr. Johnson's request to apply the one-action rule
and provisions of the trust deed statute to this proceeding.

See R. 1758-1761. No

explanation or reasoning is set forth in the Court's ruling. Id. The entire analysis set forth
in the trial court's order states, "[t]he issue of the "one action rule" was raised by the
Respondent and the court held that the one-action rule did not apply to the proceedings held
on January 23, 2006." Id. at 1760. The lack of analysis set forth in the record below is
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sufficient cause to remand the proceeding to the trial court for a full explanation of why the
one action doesn't apply to the facts of this proceeding. However, the court of appeals can
give guidance to the trial court on remand.
First and foremost, the parties agreed in the stipulated Amended Decree of Divorce
to use a trust deed and trust deed note to secure payments to Mrs. Johnson. Instead of
foreclosing on the trust deed, Mrs. Johnson has attempted, through contempt proceedings,
to attack the personal assets of Mr. Johnson. The protections provided in the Utah Trust
Deed Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19 et seq. and Utah's one-action rule require that Mrs.
Johnson foreclose on the trust deed.
In Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court
found that the Utah Trust Deed Act did not concern itself with which contract or instrument
the action is founded on, but rather the issue is whether the action is one to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security. Id. at 3. In
Smith, the Utah Supreme Court applied the protections of the Trust Deed Act to guarantors
as well as debtors, finding that the act makes no distinctions as to whether the action is
brought against the debtor or a guarantor. Under the Trust Deed Act, after a breach of an
obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security, the trustee is given the power
of sale by which the trustee may cause the trust property to be sold pursuant to the Trust
Deed Act. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23.
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The one-action rule provides that "[tjhere can be but one action for the recovery of
any debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate...."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has declared that
"[t]he underlying purpose of the single-action statute is to preclude the creditor from waiving
the security and suing directly on the contract to pay money and hold the debtor rather than
the security primarily liable." APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah App. 1996)(citations
omitted). Under this rule, "[a] creditor must foreclose and have a deficiency determined by
the court proceeding against the debtor personally." City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815
P.2d 234, 235 (Utah 1991 )(citations omitted). Utah courts have applied the one-action rule
to prevent personal liability on the part of the debtor until after foreclosure or sale of the
security and then only for the deficiency then remaining unpaid. Timm v. Dewsnup, 86 P.3d
699, 704 (Utah 2003) citing Lockhart v, Equitable Realty Co,, 657 P.2d 1333, 1334 (Utah
1983). "The one-action represents a policy preference that, when available, real property
collateral be used before the debtor's personal assets to satisfy debts. One commentator has
observed that absent this security-first requirement, the creditor could 'dispose of any of a
debtor's assets the creditor chooses and disrupt the debtors preferences in that regard, A
creditor's method of disposing of the assets also could realize fewer net proceeds than a
method chosen by a debtor.' J. David Milliner, Real Property Collateral: The "One-Action
Rule in Action, 1991 Utah L.Rev. 557, 559." APS, 927 P.2d at 673.
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The one-action rule's requirement that the security be exhausted first is primarily
intended to protect the debtor. However, the rule does not impair the right of the creditor to
recover on its loan. Id. As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, 'The purpose of the oneaction rule is to regulate the procedure of recovery of a secured creditor, not to deny the
creditor's contract right to recover on its loan/'

APS, 927 P.2d at 673 (citations

omitted)."The fundamental lesson to be drawn from our cases interpreting the one action rule
is that the primary objective is to place the personal assets of a mortgagor beyond the reach
of a mortgagee until the value of the pledged property is exhausted." Dewsnup, 86 P.3d at
705.
Utah courts have extended the reach of the one-action rule to trust deeds. Although
the rule speaks in terms of a "mortgage/1 Utah cases, as well as cases from many other
jurisdictions, have held that the one-action rule applies to trust deeds, as in this divorce
proceeding, as well as to mortgages. City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 236
(Utah 1991); See also First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 181
(D.Utah 1987); Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d at 43; Hetland, Deficiency
Judgment Limitations in California: A New Judicial Approach, 51 Cal. L.Rev. 1,35 (1963);
Keeverv. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Nev. 1980). Justice Traynor, in a case
interpreting the California one-action rule, emphasized that the effect of the one-action rule
is to limit a creditor's means of enforcing its debt but not the right to recover:
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In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a creditor secured by a trust deed or
mortgage on real property may recover the full amount of the debt upon
default. He may realize the security or sue on the obligation or both. . . . In
most states now, however, the creditor's right to enforce such a debt is
restricted by statute. . . . [T]he creditor must rely upon his security before
enforcing the debt. RoseleafCorp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.2d 35, 36, 378 P.2d
97, 98, 27 Cal.Rptr. 873, 874 (1963) (emphasis added). Peters, 815 P.2d at
236.
Utah's one-action rule provides that "[t]here can be but one action for the recovery
of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate.../'
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (emphasis added). The Utah Court of Appeals relied on the
language of the one-action statute, inteipreted in accordance with the purpose of the rule, in
finding that comakers who provide none of the security on a loan are nevertheless protected
by the one-action rule. APS v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah App. 1996).
In Briggs, four parties signed a trust deed note, which held them jointly and severally
liable to pay $75,000. The note was secured by a trust deed executed solely by only one of
the parties. The Utah Court of Appeals applied the one-action rule to prevent the personal
liability of the three individuals that did not provide security based on the following broad
language in the one-action rule: uany debt...secured by mortgage upon real estate." Id, "The
statute does not contain language restricting the rule's application to only those debts secured
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by that particular debtor's real property. The lack of such restrictive language suggests that
whether the debtor and the mortgagor are the same party or are two different parties is of no
consequence. In either case the debt is secured by the mortgage and all primary debtors are
entitled to the protections of the one-action rule." Id.
The broad language in the one-action rule statute that "any debt" or "any right"
secured by a trust deed is subject to the one-action rule makes the statute applicable to the
stipulated agreement between the parties. Although Mrs. Johnson claims the one-action rule
is inapplicable because the property settlement does not constitute a debt, the one-action rule
applies to the "enforcement of any right" secured by a trust deed. The broad language of the
statute, as well as the purpose behind the one-action rule, support applying the rule to the
present case. The litigious nature of the parties often present in domestic disputes can be
minimized by application of the one-action rule where parties to such disputes agree to secure
payments by use of trust deeds and trust deed notes. Therefore, the decision of the trial court
finding the one-action rule inapplicable should be reversed.
III.

Contempt Proceedings Violate The Utah Constitution

Mr. Johnson filed an objection to Mrs. Johnson's use of contempt proceedings in the
underlying case based on Article 1, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution- prohibiting
imprisonment for debt. The district court's reliance upon Hamilton v. Regan, 938 P.2d 282
(Utah 1997) and Bott v. Bott, 453 P.2d 402 (Utah 1969) to find that the contempt proceeding
did not violate the constitution was misplaced. Ruling Re: Order to Show Cause. See R.
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1738 - 1739. In addition, the district court relied upon the holding in Bott and viewed the
monthly payments under the stipulated divorce decree as payments for support and
maintenance, despite the fact that the stipulated divorce decree specifically states that no
alimony is awarded. Because the district court turned the monthly payments into support and
maintenance payments under Bott, then support and maintenance was statutorily terminated
by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9) when Mrs. Johnson remarried over four years ago.
In Hamilton v Regan, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding
of contempt and placing defendant in jail for twenty days when he failed to pay past due
child support. The defendant argued that the contempt proceeding violated article I, section
16 of the Utah Constitution, prohibiting imprisonment for debt. The Utah Supreme Court
found that the courts could use the contempt power for enforcement purposes to safeguard
the interests and welfare of children. The Court, citing Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P.2d 231,
232-33 (Utah 1971), stated that contempt measures are better suited to the purpose of
protecting the interests and welfare of children. In the present case, there are no minor
children at issue and therefore the reasoning in Hamilton and Harmon do not apply to this
proceeding.
Likewise, the holding in Bott is not applicable to this proceeding because the decree
in Bott did not provide a trust deed and trust deed note as a means of securing the monthly
payments. In the present action, the parties both agreed that a trust deed and trust deed note
would secure the monthly payments. By holding contempt proceedings, the district court
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completely changes the agreement of the parties and imposes conditions on Mr. Johnson that
he did not agree to in the stipulated decree. In the decree, the parties agreed that the trust
deed and trust deed note would secure the monthly payments, not contempt proceedings. In
tact, the parties struck the acceleration provision in the decree that would have made the
entire property settlement due upon untimely payments. The parties contemplated, negotiated
and agreed upon the use of the trust deed and trust deed note as security for the property
settlement. The district court does not have the jurisdiction to ignore the parties agreement
and impose contempt proceedings in place of the trust deed and trust deed note.
Finally, the district court relied upon the decision in Bott to reclassify the monthly
payment due under the divorce decree as support and maintenance. Under Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(9), support and maintenance was terminated when Mrs. Johnson remarried over
four years ago. Therefore, the monthly payments are no longer due and the matter is moot.
The district court can't have it both ways, viewing the monthly payments as support and
maintenance for purposes of the contempt power, but viewing the payments as a property
settlement for purposes of section 30-3-5(9). Therefore, should the monthly payments
continue to be classified as support and maintenance payments for Mrs. Johnson under Bott,
then the payments are no longer due since Mrs. Johnson remarried over four years ago.
IV.

Res Judicata Not Applicable to Motion to Set Aside

The trial court found that the issues set forth in Mr. Johnson's Motion to Set Aside
the Decree of Divorce filed on January 13, 2006 were already addressed and ruled on at a
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hearing held on July 28, 2003 before the Honorable Judge Claudia Laycock. See Ruling
Re: Petitioner's Objection to Notice to Submit in Re: Respondent's Motion to Set Aside
Decree of Divorce, pg. 2 (R. 1780-1781). While the trial court failed to make a specific
finding whether the basis of the decision was issue preclusion or claim preclusion, it
appears that the trial court relied upon issue preclusion as the basis for its decision. A
trial court's determination of whether res judicata bars an action presents a question of
law. See Maoris & Assocs,, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Ut, 2000). The court of
appeals should review such questions for correctness, according no particular deference
to the trial court. Id.
"Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, prevents parties or their
privies from relitigating issues which were once adjudicated on the merits and have
resulted in a final judgment.'" 3D Constr. & Dev., v. Old Standard Life Ins., 117 P.3d 1082
(Ut. App. 2005) (alteration omitted) (quoting Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco
Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678 (Ut. 2005)). In order for issue preclusion to apply, four
elements must be present: "[1] The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must
have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; [2] the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in the instant
action; [3] the issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly
litigated; and [4] the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Id.
(alterations in original). "If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there can be no
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preclusion." Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 245 (Utah 1992). The burden
of establishing each of the elements of res judicata is on the party invoking the doctrine.
See PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv. Partners, 995 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App. 2000); see also
Tirnm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993).
Neither the Court's decision (R. 1780-1781) nor the objection filed by Mrs.
Johnson (R. 1659-1661) discuss the four elements that must be present for issue
preclusion to apply. The lack of any analysis on the record below should be sufficient for
the court to remand for clarification from the trial court.
V.

Attorneys Fees Not Appropriate

The district court entered an order awarding Mrs. Johnson attorney's fees in
preparing for and attending the hearing of January 23, 2006 in the amount of $5,142.50.
See Order In Re: January 23, 2006 Hearing (R. 1759 - 1761). The affidavit submitted by
Mrs. Johnson's counsel to prepare for and attend the January 23, 2006 hearing does not
explain the charges set forth in the affidavit and contains several hearing dates other than
the January 23, 2006 hearing which was awarded by the district court. See Affidavit of
Attorney's Fees (R. 1650-1654). Mr. Johnson's counsel objected to the affidavit of
attorney's fees as excessive and not applicable to the January 23, 2006 hearing. See
Objection to Affidavit of Attorney's Fees Dated February 6, 2006 (R. 1747-1748). The
Court found that given the history of the case and the difficulty in bringing the matter for
hearing with the parties and their counsel present, the services rendered by Mrs.
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Johnson's counsel were reasonably necessary to prepare for and attend the January 23,
2006 hearing. Ruling Re: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (R. 1755-1757). In the ruling, the
district court awarded the Petitioner the amount of $5,142.50 and entered the same in the
Order, In Re: January 23, 2006 Hearing that was signed by the district court on February
27,2006. (R, 1759-1761). Nothing in the district court's ruling and order set forth why
the attorney's fee award included charges from as far back as 2004 for items such as
''preparing a case summary" and "reviewing the file".
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests
this Court overrule the District Court's decision upholding the Amended Decree of
Divorce as unambiguous, enforeceable. In addition, Mr. Johnson requests that the Court
of Appeals reverse the decision of the district court requiring Mr. Johnson to sign a trust
deed and trust deed note that was not stipulated to by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson requests
that the Court of Appeals find the use of contempt proceedings violates the Amended
Decree of Divorce, which provides security in the form of a trust deed and trust deed
note. Likewise, Mr. Johnson requests that the Court of Appeals find the use of contempt
proceedings in this instance, where the parties have mutually agreed to secure payments
under the Amended Decree with a trust deed, and where no alimony or child support was
ordered, violates the Utah Constitution as discussed above. Mr. Johnson requests that the
district court provide explanation of its finding that res judicata prevents Mr, Johnson
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from filing his Motion to Set Aside the Divorce Decree. Finally, Mr. Johnson requests
that the Court of Appeals reduce the award of attorney's fees to only those fees incurred
by Mrs. Johnson's counsel in preparation for and attending the January 23, 2006 hearing.

DATED this

v

day of October, 2006.
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R o s e in o r i d B1 a k e 1 o c k #6183
A1t o r n e y for Petitioner
305 East
3 00 South
Provo, Utah
8 4 606
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 375-7678

IN THE FOURTH D I S T R I C T COURT OF UTAH

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

NA MARIE JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

)N PAUL JOHNSON,
Responden t .
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in the name of the Petitioner.

4 . The Pet111oner
parties'

Smith

Petitioner

were

i s s u e . The Court

Jackman, Rosemond

incurred

should be paid

Barney A c c o u n t
released

to the

shares of stock

X

funds held

in

the
to

finds that the a t t o r n e y ' s
and Don Petersen

from the funds held

in the

of the funds shall

the

fees
that

Smith

then be

Petitioner.
currently

own

in International

The Court

finds

MJ-Check" . The Court

International

all

Blakelock,

and the remainder

5. The p a r t i e s

IAS).

be awarded

Barney A c c o u n t . A separate order of release

shall

of.Frederick

shall

that

finds

Automated

in excess of eight
Automated

Systems

million

(also known

the parties own a b u s i n e s s
that because

Systems

stock

a

that

known

a split of

as

as

the

would not be p r a c t i c a l

that

t h e P e t i 11. o n e r s h o 111 d b e a w a r d e d, a s f o r P e 111 i o n e r ' s share o f
th e p a r t i e s s t o c k in J n t e r na 11o n a 1 Au t om a t e d System
Petitioner's

share of

$2,800,000.00
well

as the

the *U-Cheek"

(two million

funds

eight hundred

as well

Petitioner's
Respondent

International

thousand

of

dollars),

the funds in the Smith

as the award of real property,

one-half

shall

the sum

in the Smith Barney A c c o u n t , as is set

a b o v e . The sum of $ 2 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ,
account,

company,

and

share of the property

then be awarded

Automated

Systems

4

shares

the b u s i n e s s

forth
Barney

be

settlement.

the remaining
and

shall

as

The

in

known as * U -

Check", which shall be the Respondent's share of the property
settlement.
The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner as for her share in
the above stated property as follows;
a. Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of
$8,333.33 per month, on or before the 15th of each
month, commencing ..July 1, 200.1.
b . An y a m o u n t s s t .i. 11 cl u e a n d o w i n g o n Ju 1 y 1, 2 0 0 6,
sha 11 be pa id Ln fi].11 wi t:h one ba 11 oon payment due no
late r t ha n J u1y 1, 2006.
c. There shal] be no pre-payrnent penalty, in the case
that the Respondent, pays the sums due and owing to
n Petitioner prior to the date of July 1, 2006.

h

~===^j(/

d.

I-fi—Hte—even t—payment—13 not 4^ffi^4-y made1/ • the entire

ba 1 an ee—^h--84-]—b^G#mfc=4ja&££^^

nd payable-,

e. Petitioner shall be granted a secured interest in
the *U-Check" real and personal property, to include
all inventory, and shall be a lien holder in the second
position behind the existinq loan at Zion's bank in the
U-^W]r

approximate balance of $6(J(.), OuO . 00 . Sec^<tnw

T<? $-e ^7£l>$^ P^^v

6. The Respondent shall be awarded all patents, patents
pending and .ideas that he has created.

7.

The Court

OOJiHO\^°lJ>^

finds

that

the p r o t e c t i v e

should be dismissed

order shall
bothering,

or harming

in case

and that a m u t u a l

issue, which p e r m a n e n t l y
harassing

order

number

restraining

r e s t r a i n s both parties

each other

at any time or

from

any

place,
8. The R e s p o n d e n t
associated

with

shall be r e s p o n s i b l e

for all

the p a r t i e s ' various b u s i n e s s

interests

s h o u 1 d h o 1 d t h e P e t i. t i on e r h a r rn .1 ess t h e r e f r o m ,
b u s i n e s s debt

at Zions Bank

were

prior

incurred

debts.

Petitioner

with

to the p a r t i e s ' s e p a r a t i o n ,
should deliver

9. Each party
incurred

since

each should
any debs

shall

hold

property

half to each party. The p r o p e r t y
drafting a list of all personal

The Court

finds

that

any

Respondent

associated

for any debt

he/she

5, 2000 and

should be divided,

property

if the parties

on

party.

should be d i v i d e d by the

property

that

from any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

incurred by either

the personal

a list of

the debt, was

separation on June

10. The p a r t i e s personal

and dividing

that

business

interests.

the other harmless

individually

as for

she is a w a r e and the

be responsible

the parties

i nc1 udi ng the

to the R e s p o n d e n t

then pay the d e b t s , provided
the p a r t i e s ' business

and

and debts on any credit c a r d s , which

remaining b u s i n e s s debts of which
shall

debts

acquired

equally b e t w e e n
cannot

during

oneparties
marriage

the p a r t i e s .

agree to an

equal

div.is.ion of the property that the court may consider ordering t
property sold.
11. In consideration of the foregoing award, there should
no award of alimony to PetitionerA^^-DATED and signed this / I / A a V of

\PfX^'-^

BY THEAOURT

A'-A^r^ v -?>

-r^r

t

*
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APPROVED AS TO FORM

/

Don Petersen

ft

Roseinond Blakelock #6183
A 1 1 o m e y for Pe1111oner
305 East
300 South
Prove, Utah
8 4 606
Telephone: (801) 375-7678

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Prove, Utah 8460]

INA MARIE JOHNSON,
Petri 11oner,

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
NET,DON PAUL JOHNSON,
Respondent.

Case No. 004401468
J11 d qe Jam e s Ta y1o r

This matter came before the Court; on the 2 9;; day of May,
2 001, before the Honorable James Taylor, as for trial on the
issues. The parties heretofore have been granted a Bifurcated
Decree of Divorce. Present was the Petitioner and her co-counsel,
Frederick Jackman and Rosemond Blakelock. The Respondent was also
present and represented by counsel, Don Petersen.
The Court heard from the parties and accepted the
stipulation which was read into the record. The parties and all
counsel submitted to the Court a stipulation which drafted by
hand by counsel for the Respondent, and accepted the additions
which, were cited into the record by all counsel. The Court then
inquired of both parties, on the record, whether they accepted

the s t i p u l a t i o n .
both a g r e e d

The Court

accepted

their

affirmation

to be bound by the stipulation

affirmations

that

they u n d e r s t o o d

examined

the

file and the contents

be fully

informed

and accepted

they

their

the s t i p u l a t i o n . The Court
therein

and deeming

in the p r e m i s e s , orders and

AMENDED

that

FINDINGS OF

rules as

then

itself

to

follows;

FACT

1 . T h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t the f i n d s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s w e r e
previously

granted

2. The Court
stipulation,

a bifurcated
finds that

Decree of

the parties

Divorce.
entered

to be effective on and after May

3 . The Cour t f i nds t ha t 111e Pe 111 i oner
following

real property,

subject

into a w r i t t e n

29, 2 0 0 1 .
shou 1 d be awa rded

to the e n c u m b r a n c e

that

existed

on the real p r o p e r t y on the date of the p a r t i e s ' separation
this m a t t e r ,
A.

June 5,

Petitioner

6400 N o r t h , American
is awarded

0
• / ^^rxC^

in

2000.

the real p r o p e r t y and surrounding

5629 West

the

all

right

acreage

located

at

Fork U t a h . The
and

title to the h o u s e ,

*
'3nd a p p r o x i m a t e l y
be solely

responsible

that exlsted
shall

9 acres of—land . -The Peti11oner
for the debt on

at f he time of

hold Respondent

the real

property

the part;.i es ' separation

harmless

therefrom.

sha 1 J.

and

Respondent

warrants

that he has placed no additional

real property

since

the parties

Petitioner w a r r a n t s

that she has placed

debt on the p r o p e r t y
Respondent
necessary

shall

since the p a r t i e s '

immediately

to cause

separation

the real

no

debt on
and

additional

separation.

sign any Quit Claim
property

the

to be held

Deed
solely

in the name o f the Pe 111 i.oner .
B. The real
512 South

is awarded

approximately
be solely

and surrounding

8 60 E a s t , American

Petitioner
\/

property

5.55

right

and

84 003.

The

The Petitioner

for the debt on

harm]ess

since

Petitioner w a r r a n t s

the parties

at

title, r B ^

the real

therefrom.

that he has placed no. additional

real p r o p e r t y

located

shall,

property

at the time of the p a r t i e s ' separation

shall hold R e s p o n d e n t
warrants

Fork, Utah

acres of—1 and >>

responsible

that existed

all

acreaqe

separation

that she has placed

no

and

Respondent
debt on

the

and
additional

d e b t o n t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e t: h e p a r t i e s ' separate, o n .
R e spon de n t s h a 1 J. i mm e d i ate 1 y s .i g n a n y Qu i t C .1 a i m
necessary

to cause

in the name of the
The Court
eld

f inds

the real property

to be held

solely

Petitioner.

tha t the Peti11oner

shouId be awarded

in the p a r t i e s ' Smith Barney A c c o u n t . A separate

a 11

order

of release to the Petitioner shall issue. The Court finds that
the attorney's fees of Frederick Packman, Rosemond Blakelock, and
Don Petersen that were incurred should be paid from the funds
held in the Sm11h Barney Account and the remainder of the funds
shall then be released to the Petitioner.
5. The Court, finds that the parties currently own i.n excess
of eight million shares of stock in International Automated
Systems

(also known as IAS).

The Court finds that the parties

own a business known as "fi-check". The Court finds that because a
that a split of the International Automated Systems stock would
not be practical that the Petitioner should be awarded, as for
P e 111 .i. o n e r' s s h a r e o f t hi e p a r 1: i e s s t o c: k i n Internationa 1
Automated ^System and Petitioner's share of the "U-Check" company,
the sum of $2,800,000.00

(two million eight hundred

thousand

dollars), as well as the funds in the Smith Barney Account, as is
set forth above. The sum of $2,800,000.00, the funds in the Smith
Barney account, as

well as the award of real property, shall be

Petitioner's one-half share of the property settlement. The
Respondent shall
International

then be awarded the remaining shares in

Automated Systems and the business known as %Mj-

Check", which shall

be the Respondent's share of the property

settlement.

A

The Respondent

shall

pay

the above stated p r o p e r t y
a. R e s p o n d e n t

Lhe P e t i t i o n e r

as f o l l o w s ;

shall

pay to the P e t i t i o n e r

$8,333.33 per m o n t h , on or b e f o r e
m o n t h , c o mm e n c 1 n a
b.

Any a m o u n t s

shall be paid
later

than

in

the

the sum of

15'" of

each

< 11 ,i 1 y 1 , 2 0 0 1 .

still

July

as for her share in

due and o w i n g on July

1, 2 006,

full with one b a l l o o n payment

clue no

1, 2006.

c. There shal.1 bo no pre-payment penalty, in the case
that the Respondent, pays the sums due and owing to
Petitioner prior to the date of July 1, 2006.
d

']

V ^

J&b&sr\

i*i*^l^H

1 v^c/) LLilC^Jlj.!T^lLQlL^^l-^Luj j, [ H,-i-fii i .;^ij,ijjai-

-

e. Petitioner shall be granted a secured interest in
the MJ-Check" real and personal property, to include
all inventory, and shall be a lien holder in the second
position behind the existing loan at Zion's bank m
9

w

v

the

approximate balance of $ 600, 000 . 00 . Jr Gv/*j ry To 3x A

n

. The Court finds that, the Respondent should be awarded all
pa fen ts , pa tent s pending and idea s that he has created.
1.

QO

^iHO

order

T1 he Cour I; f inds f ha t the protective order in case number

IV. T 3
shall

s ho u 1 d be d i sm i s s ed and
issue, which permanently

tha t

a mu t u a 1 r e s t r a i n l n a

r e s t r a i n s both p a r t i e s

from

^

r

^ ^

bothering,

harassing

or h a r m i n g

each other at any

time or

any

place.
8. The Court
for all

finds that

debts associated

the R e s p o n d e n t

with

int e r e st s a nd s hou J d h o1d

should be

the p a r t i e s ' v a r i o u s

responsible

business

the Pe t i t i on e r ha rm1 ess t h e re f r om,

]n c1u d i n q t h e b u s in e s s de b t a t Zio n s Bank and debts o n a n y c redi t
cards, which were

incurred

for b u s i n e s s d e b t s .

prior

Petitioner

to the p a r t i e s ' separation,
should deliver

a list of any remaining b u s i n e s s debts of which
the R e s p o n d e n t

shall

was associated

with

9. The Court
any debt he/she
2000 and

should be divided,
by

should

the p a r t i e s

hold

cannot

ordering

the p r o p e r t y

should

be

property

the p e r s o n a 1 - p r o p e r t y

finds

that

of the p r o p e r t y
sold.

party.

property

a list of all personal

the p a r t i e s . The Court

for

any

to each p a r t y . The property

aqree to an equal d i v i s i o n

may consider

from

incurred by either

a c q i..] 1 r e d d u r i n g m a r r i a q e a n d d i v i d i n g
equally between

debt

separation on June 5,

the p a r t i e s p e r s o n a l

the parties d r a f t i n g

and

interests.

the other h a r m l e s s

individually

finds that
one-half

that the

each p a r t y shall be responsible

since

on any debs

10. The Court

divided

finds that

Respondent

she is aware

the d e b t s , provided

the p a r t i e s ' b u s i n e s s

incurred

that each

responsibility

then pay

to the

as

if the

parties

that the

court

li.

in

lon^Ki^c'tion

^ r dliiiK ij

"^ a v ^ i d

to

R/^FD u p o n tfu
-> c urs and

)rcifr^

cf

the

award,

there

shrulj

\p

Fetitioner.

foreqomq
dc

foreqoinu

Findinqs

of

FCK

ts,

the

TOUT

t nc w

lolUws;
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.
ub]oct~
:Uf b

The ( c u r t

hf

rru

[etit1oier

t hf

"jurisdiction

oi

law t h a t

ovor

it

has

t ho p a r t i e s

and

C d^e .

jurt

c i ( ludes

J^ e n t i t l e d

He p e n d e n t ,
-in 1 t h a t

as a matter

irinM o r a n ] p e r s o n a l
) f

"\

c mclucics

base]

to

a matter

a n Amended

upon t h e

therefore,

as

grounds

D e e r e e of

of

dd^quat e grounds

OJ law t h a t

the

Divorce

irreconcilable
exist

for

the

from

[}r

differences

qrdiiting

of

divoroe.
;

.

A Derrpc

( ( nsistenl
n^T^P

WJ ih

of

Divorce

Liu

ind s i q n d

orders
Mn= d

s h o u l d b e qranted
as

set

forth

/ ' ti&y o r

7

nno i s s u e d w h i c h

(Jbo\ie.
V ^ ^ c ^

> 2001

is
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